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TO:	Rebecca Sch	ore ,				
CASE	NAME (Plaintiffs) US Bank	v National A		rendants)	laryse Guillaume	Appeal Non- Appeal
	ER COURT DOCKET			/ER COURT NUMBER f2686908		Transcript Request Date: 1/14/2010
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1	SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION
2	GENERAL EQUITY PART ESSEX COUNTY
3	DOCKET NO.: F-26869-08 A.D. NO.
4	US BANK NATIONAL ASSOC., ) TRANSCRIPT
5	Plaintiff, ) OF ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
6	V )
7	MARYSE GUILLAUME, et al, )
8	Defendant. )
9	Place: County Courts Building 50 W. Market Street Newark, NJ 07102
10	Date: November 10, 2009
11	BEFORE:
12	THE HONORABLE HARRIET FARBER KLEIN, J.S.C.
13	TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY:
14 15	REBECCA SCHORE, ESQUIRE Legal Services of New Jersey 100 Metroplex Drive @ Plainfield Avenue Suite 402, Box 1053 Edson, New Jersey 08818
16	APPEARANCES:
17	SHARON MCMANN, (phonetic) ESQUIRE
18	Attorney on behalf of the Plaintiff
19	ALAN K. BALDWIN, ESQUIRE (Broderick Newmark & Grather) Attorney on behalf of the Defendant
20	
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23	Audio Recorded
24	Recording Opr: J.P.
25	

# Colloquy

1	THE COURT: This case is <u>US BANK NATIONAL</u>
2	ASSOCIATION VS GUILLAUME. And it is Docket Number
3	F-20869-08. I'll take appearances of counsel for the
4	record.
5	MR. BALDWIN: Alan Baldwin from Broderick
6	Newmark & Grather on referral from Legal Services.
7	MISS MCMANN: Sharon McMann of Fallon
3	Palamene and Schmede (phonetic) for Plaintiff.
9 -	THE COURT: Thank you. This is a return date
10	of an order to show cause filed on behalf of the
11	Defendant that seeks to vacate the default judgment
12	that has been entered in this matter. And a Sheriff's
13	sale that has been pending has been consequently
14	adjourned so that the Court could hear this motion.
15	I think that today was the latest Sheriff's
16	sale date. And pursuant to my instructions,
17	Plaintiff's counsel advised the Sheriff that if the
18	property was sold this afternoon it would be only with
19	a stipulation or a condition, caveat, whatever you want
20	to call it placed upon the sale that it was subject to
21	being vacated and in all respect dependent on what the
22	Court would rule this afternoon.
23	So with that I'll hear oral argument in
24	support of your requested relief Mr. Baldwin.
25	MR. BALDWIN: Yes Your Honor. I would like

to focus my time on the part of my application brought under Rule 4:51(f), which is the catchall that entitles a moving party to relief under circumstances which are necessary fit into the other categories of the rule.

And specifically I'd like to address the issue of the appearance of the Plaintiff to the Court rules in entering judgment in this case because I believe that in this Court the issue is not the existence or non-existence of a debt. We're not in the Law Division. Nobody's being sued under a note.

The issue in this case in this Court is does the Plaintiff have the right to foreclose a security interest in my client's home. And I suggest Your Honor that the answer to that question depends on the adherence by the plaintiff to the Court rules. As I reviewed the opposition to the motion submitted by Plaintiff's counsel, it struck me that what counsel has argued to the Court is that there are two sets of rules.

And that one set of rules, Rule 144, Rule 166 which establish the way litigants bring proofs before the Court in the context of motions applies to all the litigants in the universe of litigants, but not to foreclosure Plaintiffs who believe that Rule 464:2 creates an exception because it authorizes lawyers to

1 | certify to the authenticity of certain documents.

And Your Honor it doesn't seem to me reasonable to suggest to argue that there are two sets of rules. There's one set of rules. And Rule 464 could be read and should be read in conjunction with 144, 166. If a moving party in a foreclosure case wants to put before the Court a document other than an original, that can be done by a lawyer under 464.

But under 144 and 166 that lawyer has got to comply with the same standards that every other affiant complies with when they submit certifications to the Court. Under 166 the certification has got to create a foundation because only statements in a certification are only admissible to the extent that they would be admissible when they're made in open Court.

So under the facts in this case Your Honor the affiant who is intending to put before the Court a promissory note has got to say I saw the note. I saw the copy of the note and I can certify that the one is an exact copy of the latter. In order to comply with 144 that affiant must say in writing that he or she is aware that if the statements in the certification are wilfully false, the affiant is subject to punishment because without that protection, the procedural protections the rules provide for all litigants are

1 | eviscerated in the foreclosure context.

I believe this goes beyond just adherence to the Court rules. I believe there is a constitutional issue here in that the rules provide the procedural due process that litigants are entitled to in the Court system. And when those rules are short circuited and a litigant runs the risk of losing their home because the rules are short circuited to me that goes directly to the rights of the litigant, the constitutional rights of the litigant to expect due process.

Now, I'd also like to touch very briefly on an aspect of Plaintiff's argument which just out of rebuttal I just can't let it go unsaid. And that is in response to the argument that I made under part little a of the rule which requires me to submit before the Court a "meritorious defense".

The Plaintiff has argued that the Plaintiff is a holder in due course and therefore defenses such as the Truth in Lending Act defense do not apply because they're a holder in due course. For a holder of a note to be a holder in due course, the holder of the note had to have taken the note without knowledge of the default.

And I'd ask the Court to look at Exhibit F attached to the certification of Plaintiff's counsel

which consists of the two assignments of the note filed in this case and to Exhibit I which is a copy of the complaint and Your Honor will note that the earlier of the two assignments is dated July 14<sup>th</sup>, 2008. It was filed on the 31<sup>st</sup>, but it's dated the 14<sup>th</sup>. The complaint is dated the 15<sup>th</sup>.

The idea that this Plaintiff did not know there was a default when it took ownership of the debt is to me incredible and I simply don't buy it. And I would suggest that the barest amount of discovery would reveal the contrary, that being that this Plaintiff is not a holder in due course and took the debt at a time when it had full knowledge of a default. And was in fact at the time in the process of drafting a foreclosure complaint.

THE COURT: But remember something --

MR. BALDWIN: Yes ma'am.

THE COURT: -- that was the formal

19 assignment.

MR. BALDWIN: Right.

THE COURT: This was part of a pooling and servicing agreement under which they took this loan as well as others on or about October 1, 2006. So at that point there had been no default.

MR. BALDWIN: I don't know that. That's

1 possible.

2 THE COURT: Well, they say so.

3 MR. BALDWIN: Okay.

THE COURT: And they furnish versions of that pooling and servicing agreement. So I think at least based on that, your argument as the holder in due course looks to have merit.

MR. BALDWIN: It would certainly create a factual issue that would require a little delving into when the -- and my client certified if I may that they fell behind on the loan. And I guess it was '07. So based on that you're right.

THE COURT: All right. But you have other issues I'm aware of --

MR. BALDWIN: Yes.

THE COURT: -- that you're trying to further.

MR. BALDWIN: Well, I don't want to reinvent the wheel, I just wanted to hit what I believe are the central high points. I want to address the issue of the holder in due course because I didn't really address it in my reply brief. But I want to focus the Court's attention if I could on the question of whether or not Plaintiff's in foreclosure cases are bound by the same rules that the rest of us are bound by.

I know when I submit a certification for my

L	client's signature or over my own, I've got to comply
2	with the rules. I can't make stuff up. I can't tell
3	the Court I've seen a document when I haven't. And if
1	I'm going to tell the Court that I have a document,
5	I've got to say this is a copy of the original and I've
5	got to say that I'm aware that if I'm misstating the
7	facts I'm subject to punishment.

And that simply was not done here. And under these facts this plaintiff should not be allowed to enter a foreclosure Judgment at this time. Thank you judge.

THE COURT: Well, they have a judgment.

MR. BALDWIN: I'm sorry. You're right. They should not have been allowed to and it should be vacated because of -- intents.

THE COURT: See I guess you know an overriding policy question which comes to my mind is even taking account of all of the allowances that we are giving to mortgage debtors these days and the mediation program being one of them to afford sufficient time for people to try to stay in their homes, keep their homes.

Is it appropriate to allow a case to go all the way through judgment and up to the eve of Sheriff's sale and then assert something like that --

1 I mean it's going to call something a technicality. Now, I know when you start putting in 2 3 the specter of due process consideration assuming that's what we have here, I know it sounds very 4 belittling to say technicality but it's truly what 5 we're working with here. Because the basic elements of 6 their case are not denied. 7 MR. BALDWIN: Well, Your Honor -- I'm sorry. 8 9 THE COURT: Well, go ahead. No, no I'd like you to respond to that. I mean basically the execution 10 or delivery of the mortgage, the default on the 11 12 mortgage. 13 MR. BALDWIN: Here's --THE COURT: No one's raising standing issues. 14 I mean really where are we going here with this. 15 16 MR. BALDWIN: Well, in terms of the defense, if the Guillaume's had come to me before the due date 17 of their answer and I was able to file an answer for 18 them, I would have asserted at that time a failure of 19 the Plaintiffs to comply with the Fair Foreclosure Act 20 because the notice was defective. And under the EMC 21 Chibery (phonetic) case alone is fatal to a mortgage 22 foreclosure case proceeding. 23 THE COURT: Well, not necessarily. Chibery

24

was a failure of service, --

1 MR. BALDWIN: Right. THE COURT: -- a complete failure of service 2 3 MR. BALDWIN: Yes. 4 THE COURT: -- of the N.O.I. So the Court 5 directed that the action be dismissed. It's a case 6 content issue, which I think is what you're raising and 7 that it named the servicer and not the true lender. I 8 think the worst that the Plaintiff would suffer would 9 10 be to serve a new N.O.I. setting forth the lender's name. That's how I read Chibery. And then there's 11 12 another case involving a bank. It skips my mind right 13 now. MR. BALDWIN: I'm aware of that case as well. 14 THE COURT: See those two cases are in 15 conflict. One has a dismissal and the other doesn't. 16 And the way I reconcile them is the bank case I think 17 it was was a content issue whereas Chibery was a 18 service issue, much more serious. 19 MR. BALDWIN: I representing a Plaintiff Your 20 Honor would look at Chibery a little more narrowly and 21 focus on the language which says that the Fair 22 Foreclosure Act must be strictly adhered to and that

the penalty for non strict adherence would be

dismissal. And also observed that the earlier the bank

23

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case you alluded to I think it was four or five years old or older than the Chibery case which is relatively recent.

So if a more recent opportunity that the Appellate Division has had to speak to the subject, theyv'e told us in Chibery that the issues must be — the Statute must be strictly complied with and that the penalty for non strict compliance was dismissal.

Your Honor, to the question you posed to me about the defenses, the Plaintiff in this case has provided the Court with not one but two assignments of the mortgages. Now, there's obviously something going on there.

THE COURT: There was a problem with the notarization on the first one. And so there was a corrected assignment.

MR. BALDWIN: Right. After my papers were submitted I did read the deposition of Mr. Strahan (phonetic) who took the notary of the first assignment. So I'm aware of what those issues are. They're not before the Court on this record but I'm aware of it. But what is before the Court on this record is the promissory note attached to the Plaintiff's certification.

That note has an allonge attached to it which

1	for whatever reason is not endorsed. And to me where I
2	again were I in this case at the very beginning I would
3	inquire where is this note that is apparently floating
4	around the ozone some place with a blank spot on the
5	back of endorsement which nobody it's not filled in.
6	And instead we have these two assignments executed
7	within a few months of each other.

THE COURT: It was a little more than that.

I think it's more than that. --

MR. BALDWIN: Okay. Right. Right.

THE COURT: I don't think there's anything sinister there really but. I think the more definitive date is the 2006 -- service agreement date. And those agreements be speak the fact that the loan of the mortgage and the note was transferred together with a whole lot of other ones.

So I didn't see a standing issue in this case at all. And that's why I dazed to call it a pure technicality. And you know we have a couple of them here because I certainly appreciate the importance of the notice of intent. And I know the language of Chibery. We are not free to deviate from the unambiguous Statute.

But it just seemed ironic in this case that they use the designation America Servicing Company

which is the entity that your client was dealing with on a monthly basis. And they had put the lender's name in there. I certainly think that that could have been more confusing to these particular debtors.

MR. BALDWIN: I think the Statute requires both because the Statute requires that the notice intent should identify the owner of the loan and phone number and address of someone for the borrower to contact to try to resolve issues. So I would suggest to the Court that that calls for both dealer of the loan and the servicing company if the servicing company is the one that's going handle that kind of investigation.

What this notice did was to not only not describe the owner of the loan, it falsely identified the servicer as the loan. So it was this not only incomplete, it was incorrect. It was just plain wrong. They provided half the information required by that -- Statute but not all the information.

THE COURT: But the goal of that notice is

-- I want to know if you agree -- is to enable the

debtor to be able to contact somebody to cure the

default within a certain period of time to say -- and I

mean oh your client certainly would be the contact.

She was doing the right -- and the letter said so.

1 MR. BALDWIN: She was trying. She was trying.

THE COURT: Yes, correct. So I mean it just strikes me as ironic. Now, I understand if -- to the stip letter of the Statute but it just doesn't seem like the policies of the Fair Foreclosure Act are furthered here by what you say the Statute required them to do. That's where I'm having a problem.

MR. BALDWIN: But the policy of the act is as you say among other things to permit borrowers or give borrowers information they need to contact someone on behalf in order to work things out. But the act requires that that be done in a very specific way including very specific information which just simply wasn't done.

So again were I defending this case at the beginning within 35 days of the filing of the complaint, I think I would have had frankly a slam dunk on that issue or for nothing else if Your Honor chose to not dismiss the case. It would have to stayed under the bank case where it can get stayed for a month or two to allow compliance. If I remember that's what happened in that case.

So there are a number of ways that it could have played out. But Your Honor we're dealt with the

1	cards we're dealt with. And I got into this case when
2	my clients contacted me and I immediately did what I
3	could do to get the issues before the Court.
4	THE COURT: You're not saying it's your
5	fault, absolutely not. That wasn't the import of my
6	statement but I would think that you have the job
7	you know what you're given. All right. I mean I think
8	I have your argument. Well, I did want to ask one more
9	question though. During this period of time that
10	you've been involved to your knowledge has there been
11	any effort to actually engage in the formal mediation
12	program on your client?
13	MR. BALDWIN: Well, interestingly enough when
14	we were in the hallway just a few minutes ago I was
15	informed by my client a Brand New Day
16	THE COURT: Yes.
17	MR. BALDWIN: had contacted my client.
18	THE COURT: Right.
19	MR. BALDWIN: That's one of the companies
20	they contacted asking if they had heard from the lender
21	regarding a mediation. And they haven't heard
22	anything, nor have I.
23	THE COURT: Wait a minute, I don't understand
24	that. I mean did they file for mediation?

MR. BALDWIN: Yes.

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THE COURT: They have to initiate with an application with financial documents.

MR. BALDWIN: I believe that along the way

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they threw this Brand New Day company. They did apply.

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It wasn't through me so I don't know what was

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submitted. I will say that this lender has been

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similarly unresponsive in that I sent in a qualified

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request for information. I didn't get that. I sent

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them a request for some other documents. I haven't

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gotten that. So you know I don't know what's going on

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behind the scenes Judge.

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THE COURT: There's always two sides to a

13 story.

MR. BALDWIN: There are.

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14

THE COURT: You know I read their papers and

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they say your clients didn't say all the information

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they were supposed to. And that's a major reason why

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they weren't successful thus far in negotiating with

19

them. I don't know where the truth lies there. But

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you could always have some hope I suppose. All right.

21

Miss McMann I'll hear you in opposition.

22

MISS MCMANN: Yes, Judge. Thank you. In no

23

way is Plaintiff attempting to ignore the Court Rules

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but pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 4:64-2, in lieu

of an original document, a certified document may be

produced. The manner in which the note was submitted as proofs for final judgment is always accepted by the foreclosure unit. Invalidating that would invalidate thousands of foreclosures in New Jersey.

So it's our position that the note and the manner in which it was submitted was proper. In regards to Defendant's argument as to the notice of the intent to foreclose, the purpose of the notice as Your Honor has stated is to clearly and conspicuously state in a manner calculated to make the debtor aware of the situation.

Not only were the Defendants making payments to American Servicing Company for two years, but they had continued to work with them. In this matter, it was absolutely proper especially considering that they are natives of another country. It clearly put them on notice as to the default.

As Your Honor has stated if it had come from U.S. Bank National Association as trustee for CFA being mortgaged back passed through certificate series 2006-3, there's a good chance that the Defendants might have not had any idea as to what that was in regards to.

But considering that this was a non-purchase money mortgage executed in September of '06, that is

currently due for April 1<sup>st</sup> of 2008 with an upset to my client as of today in the amount of \$258,645. I see no reason for any further delaying on a foreclosure action.

And then in regards to Defendant's allegations that they have not heard from us in regards to the mediation program, as the Court is aware that would have come directly from the Court that notice. We would not be involved at all in the scheduling of the actual mediation.

THE COURT: I don't know whether the application was sent in through Brand New Day. But I do know from the coordinator who I've heard up to the minute through today that they are scheduling it to March.

MISS MCMANN: Yes I was -- this morning.

THE COURT: So I don't really know whether it's, you know, optimistic, overly optimistic to think that we're going to get a mediation in as much before — the winter, you know the late winter which of course is a considerable time away.

Let me go back McManan just for a moment because this whole issue they're raising about the certification of a true copy because I mean I understand the rule and the practice. But there is

always I guess a bit of a difference in how a Court scrutinizes it when the issue is raised as opposed when something goes through unopposed or uncontested.

I think what they're challenging is the basis upon which the attorney in their office or any attorney for that matter certifies that it's a true copy. I think they assert that it says credulity to believe that he actually went to US Bank and examined the original note that is in their vault or wherever it is.

So I guess the real question is on what basis does the attorney purport to be able to certify that this is a true copy if you go through the process that the rules of Court normally do require putting aside right now magic language. Okay. But had they actually made an examination from a computer screen even.

I don't know how it's done but I think a lot of times it is from a computer screen that they see the document and say this is identical. I've compared it line for line. Do you happen to know I mean what the procedure is when that's done?

MISS MCMANN: Judge, as you stated the notes are kept in a secured location. The lender is very unwilling to just send out the original note. We request a copy of the original note from our client.

They sent to us what is advised to us to be an actual

and true original copy of the note.

THE COURT: So how come because it would be an easy thing, would it not, for the client to certify that this is a true copy of what's in our fault. And I think that would basically undercut their whole argument. So it just is curious to me that you kind of run the risk of this type of challenge when if that's how it's done if a client is sending you a copy of what it has, why don't you have them do a certification saying I've examined the original here's a true copy. Right.

MISS MCMANN: That is true as well Judge.

THE COURT: Right.

MISS MCMANN: Yes.

THE COURT: So I suppose one possibility today is I could carry this motion and likewise adjourn the Sheriff's sales officially for you to cure that. And probably the Guillaume's don't mind that at all because they're waiting for a mediation anyway. And time is very important to them to try to be able to extricate themselves from their predicament.

I mean that's the Holy Grail as far as I see it time in all of these cases. So I'm just throwing that out for your consideration. I mean if that's really what Defendants now are going to be saying that

we have to tighten this up a little bit. And make the client certify that that's really a copy of what we have in our secret storage place. I'm being fictitious but I mean you know wherever these things are under lock and key somebody has custody of them. Okay.

Now, this issue also about the notice of intent that's easily curable too I would think, right, by sending out a new one, amending it to put in the true lender.

MISS MCMANN: Yes, Judge but as stated it would be our position that our Notice of Intent to foreclose met the standard by making the Defendants aware of the default. I mean once received the Defendants attempted to work with America Servicing Company. There were numerous letters sent from the Defendant to American Servicing. They're reflected in phone conversations.

And there's really no paper that I'm aware of to this point that says that the Notice of Intent can't come from the Plaintiff's servicing company.

THE COURT: Well, it's just the language of the Statute. I think that's really the underpinning because it uses the term lender. And there is a difference between a lender and a servicer. I think that's really all they've got to go on plus the

language of the Chibery case which I think is distinguishable.

But it does have that famous phrase in there no denying it how the statutory language is unambiguous. We can't deviate from it. I'm very troubled about this issue. I really am because the over arching purpose of that Statute is so the mortgagor just like I said before knows what to do to cure that default and avoid a foreclosure.

And Courts have you know come down on the Plaintiffs when they do it in such a way that it's confusing, that it's misleading, that they don't give a phone number or a contact person. And those things I think are really substantive. So you know the question here are we elevating form over substance. And it's hard for me to imagine that the legislature ever intended that or the Court that decided Chibery intended that.

But at the same time I guess if we're going to be super careful and dot our eyes and cross our t's this is something curable. It's a matter of sending out a new one. And waiting that 30 plus days which actually would I suppose dovetail with a new certification, a true copy certification. Maybe that's the answer here.

MISS MCMANN: But Judge would that just start 1 2 our foreclosure action all over again. I mean --3 THE COURT: No, no. I think there is a difference. I know look obviously Mr. Baldwin wants me 4 to dismiss this. But he hasn't made a motion for that 5 actually. He wants to vacate the default judgment. 6 But he would probably ideally say it should be 7 dismissed. That's what Chibery requires. 8 And I think I've already indicated that I 9 think that's draconian. And I think that it's not 10 appropriate on this set of circumstances. That the 11 most I would do is say serve a new Notice of Intent. 12 And you have to wait the requisite amount of time 13 before going forward with the judgment. 14 Now, I'm not sure what stage that time that 15 you know where you could have a Sheriff's sale and 16 that's all. That's all that the server can be offered. 17 So if I just like say I delay a Sheriff's sale you 18 can't continue to proceed with the foreclosure. That's 19 the worse thing to happen. Fine. MISS MCMANN: Right. 21 THE COURT: Anything else you wanted to say? 22 MISS MCMANN: Just that in this case as 23 everything -- Your Honor has mentioned there are as 24

reported there are three main issues for a foreclosure

action that must be proven as undisputed: -- the
mortgage, the amount of the debt. And there -mortgage benefit which have all been proven in this
case. Thank you Judge.

THE COURT: I think it's the last one that's mostly in dispute. So let's hear again so you can have a little bit of reply Mr. Baldwin.

MR. BALDWIN: I just would like to direct the Court's attention and counsel's attention the language in 46:2 -- I'm sorry 464:2(a) which says that in lieu of an original document the moving party may produce a legible copy of a recorded or filed document.

That would apply to the mortgage and arguable an assignment because those are recorded and filed certified as a true copy by the recording or filing officer or by a New Jersey attorney, or a copy of an original document if unfiled or unrecorded certified as a true copy by a New Jersey attorney.

The rule requires that the note be examined by a New Jersey attorney who certifies to the Court this is the note. And with all due respect my adversary if in fact we got a certification from somebody I'll make light of this in Ohio who says I'm the records keeper and here's a copy of the note.

I would be in front of Your Honor in a month

and I'd say Your Honor with all due respect this person is not a New Jersey attorney and that's where this element of proof is still missing.

THE COURT: Well, you know if that be the position I would have to concur with what Plaintiff's counsel is saying that this would literally turn the mortgage industry on its head. And I think that rule was written that way for a reason, especially in this day and age when the industry and society in general operates very much electronically.

I mean may be back in the anti -- period it would be possible for a New Jersey attorney to emulate over to the local bank and go in and see an officer and ask to see the actual note, the original note. Today it's almost ludicrous to think that could happen because these entities are all over the country. And as we know these things are transacted often in bundles as part of these pooling and servicing agreements.

And I think under the rule it's designed to recognize that and accommodate to the extent practical. So as not to put too great an obstacle on a forecloser lender. I mean this shouldn't be a game. This shouldn't be a situation where we make the hurdles so high. Normally, the issues that we have comes up in the standing context where it's argued that they don't

have the note Judge. They can't produce it. It's a show me argument.

But here when you have a client servicing agreement, when you have a situation as what happened here that argument really is pretty much cut off. And I think that the foreclosure unit and most Courts would accept the type of certification that we have here when they do look on computer screens. A know that for a fact that's how a lot of it happens.

They squirrel and they see what's is there.

And then they get a copy from the client saying this is a copy of what we have. And I frankly think that's reasonable. And I just I'm not about to totally change over the foreclosure practice and the industry. If the Civil Practice Committee wants to impose that kind of a hurdle, then I think it's up to them to do so and revise foreclosure rules accordingly.

But I know of no such suggestion within the counsel of General Equity Judges who recommends anything like that I think for the reasons that I just stated. — so I understand what you're saying Mr. Baldwin, a rule is the rule right now. And it's a matter of interpretation.

Alrighty. Well, let me try to take this from the top and just go through the various arguments that

#### Findings

1	have been advanced and see where we come out here with
2	this motion today which was brought under Rule 4:43-3
3	and Rule 4:50-1, specifically subsection F. And I
4	think subsection has been proceeded as well.

A motion for relief from the Judgement under any of the six grounds in the rule should be granted sparingly. It is addressed to the sound discretion of the Trial Court which has to balance a lot of conflicting policies and issues. Among them is the finality that usually you accord to judgment.

But of course it would be an injustice to enforce a judgment just because the finality a Court has the discretion to set it aside. Marder vs Realty Construction Company 84 N.J. Super at 313 at 319, App. Div. (1964). I'm going to deal first with the subsection A of the rule. I'm going to take them in the order in which they're stated.

And as conceded by counsel they have to make a showing of meritorious defense as well as what is called excusable neglect. The latter is usually defined as being "attributable to an honest mistake that is compatible with due diligence or reasonable prudence."

Mancini ex Rel. New Jersey Auto Full

Insurance Underwriting Association 132 N.J. 334 at 335

Supreme Court (1993). The excusable neglect that is
proper here is that Defendant's were diligently working
to try to reach an accommodation to get a modification
of their loan to try to refinance, to do something that
they could find affordable that was amenable to the
lender.

The facts themselves show that they contacted Tri-City for a housing counselor in April of 2008.

They got the Notice of Intent in May 2008. They were personally served, no dispute about it, with summons and complaint in foreclosure on or about July 21, 2008. That whole month they contacted America Servicing Company to try to benefit from what they called their borrowers counseling program.

The next month they sought the help of New Jersey Citizen Action. That brings us to August of 2008. They engaged in these modification efforts with America Servicing Company somewhere from in or about it looks like November or December of 2008 all the way to April '09 when there was a letter, I think the second such letter rejecting them.

Now, despite that -- oh I don't want to forget this. Excuse me. May 6<sup>th</sup>, '09 they were served with a motion for final judgment. And they got a copy of the judgment on or about that time. So at that

point in May '09 they still hadn't sought legal advice.

And they didn't call legal services until June '09 and got their present attorney. They were referred to him

I think late August. He took it from there.

And somewhere also in the last two months

Brand New Day was involved to try to get them engaged
in a mediation. I have a lot of problems with saying
that with all that's going, with all this evidence of
Court process for over a year, to just rely on trying
to negotiate something with the bank was like sticking
your head in the sand.

This wasn't going to go away and they didn't get any assurance from the bank that they were succeeding in their negotiation efforts or that an answer to the complaint was not required. I mean they just basically focused on one path. And they ignored the negotiation path and they ignored the litigation side of things. You can't do that.

And I have to say that I think that these -Jurors were more astute than most. I mean the fact
that Mrs. Guillaume was being so aggressive and so
persistent in trying to negotiate and going to all
these different places to get help, but the one place
she wasn't going was a member of the bar, a lawyer
which is usually what you do when you get Court papers.

Or if you absolutely can't afford a lawyer and that's the case of many foreclosures, a very heavy self-represented area of the law to at least contact the Court yourself and you send in some rudimentary answer. And it doesn't have to be fancy. I mean you write a letter to the foreclosure Unit, they'll stamp 7 contested on it.

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Because I've seen so many of them longhand. But nothing was done. And I don't regard that as excusable neglect. So that prong is lacking. But you know to look at the meritorious defenses which I think to make a complete record I should do. The one that is asserted is the Truth in Lending Act. And we haven't spent much time on the record today talking about it, but it comes down to I think \$120 error.

-- spending this afternoon talking about things that are fairly minuscule. But I mean it is what it is. The Plaintiff argues in response that it is a holder in due course. Something I've already talked about. And I think that that has merit in this context. But interestingly enough in other states Courts have held that such status is not a defense against appeal recession. Thomas vs Leja, L-e-j-a 187 Michigan Appeals 418 at 423 Michigan Court of Appeals (1991).

## Findings

And there is also an unpublished opinion from
the Northern District of Illinois which I recognize I
really shouldn't rely on but it goes back to 2004. I
think the approach the Court took there is very
interesting in this case of Murry vs Americas Mortgage
Banking (2004) U.S. District Lexus 12818. Northern
District Illinois (2004).

They said that -- "recession provision effectively abrogates the holder in due course rule, making any assignee subject to all claims or defenses that the consumer could assert against a predator unless the assignee demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that a reasonable person exercising ordinary due diligence could not determine based on the documentation required by the subchapter the itemization of the amount financed."

And as I said before I'm not really relying on that case for my handling of this motion today. NO one was really prepared to deal with that kind of approach. I'm not going to hold anybody to it. But I think looking at the Teeler (phonetic) statement here it certainly wouldn't be apparent. Nobody would look at that on its face and know that there was an error of the type that Defendants the have pointed out.

I couldn't really hold that against thsi

Plaintiff and say that they took good notice or
anything like that. So I mean that approach kind of
makes sense. It's very logical. It's very rational.

Another thing that I note in this case I mean we're not
talking about an amount that was financed per se.

According to the HUD-1 I mean this charge, this alleged overcharge for recording was something that was paid at closing. It doesn't really seem to fit the rubric of these Teeler cases. And even though it's over the \$35 I mean I think it is so diminimus that I would allow them to assert that holder in due course status in this situation.

Next we move to this Fair Foreclosure Act issue. It does appear that the Plaintiff failed to comply with the exact requirement of the Statute. They did adhere for the most part. They did have all the statutorily required information except for the exact name of the lender. What they did was they -- ASC as a holder of the mortgage. And it was not. It is the servicer of the mortgage.

It would have been nice if they had both in there. And again I think that would have -- particular issue if they set forth the exact status of each of those entities. So although I am of the view that the NOI looking at it in its totality as "clearly and

conspicuously made the debtor aware of the situation" pursuant to NJSA2(a):50-56(d).

I will require sending of a new Notice of
Intent to correct this one problem. In all other
respects I think it passes muster. And that should be
done as soon as is reasonable feasible. Now, I don't
really think that once it's done assuming that the cure
is not forthcoming, we would need a further motion
argument. But I'm willing to carry my decision. I'm
going to carry the motion essentially for a sufficient
period of time to allow for the service of a proper
NOI. I'll just give the motion a new date.

And unless you have an issue with the new NOI Mr. Baldwin I think that I would — at that point make my decision on the motion if they satisfy what they're supposed to, the motion would likely be denied. But I would give you an opportunity to furnish me with any additional briefing or papers if you thought there was still something that the Court should take note of, factor into its' decision.

And if necessary Miss McMann if you want to be heard on that and either of you wish to come back for oral argument I certainly would not preclude it.

But I think I probably should carry this to a motion day in January. That's what I believe would most likely

## Findings

- 1 be necessary. Let me see. I think it's January  $15^{\rm th}$ .
- 2 And by that time your client -- you should be able to
- 3 get out the new notice Miss McMann and then there will
- 4 be sufficient time under it for the Defendants to cure.
- 5 Mr. Baldwin.
- 6 MR. BALDWIN: Your Honor, just procedurally
- 7 | instructing, I hope you're instructing Plaintiff's
- 8 counsel to serve a copy of the new notice on me and on
- 9 the Court.
- 10 THE COURT: Oh I certainly think that that's
- 11 | absolutely required, yes.
- 12 MR. BALDWIN: Thank you Judge.
- 13 THE COURT: Yes, so that we're aware that it
- 14 has gone out and we have an opportunity to examine it,
- 15 sure. No question about that. So that is as much as I
- 16 | believe I can rule upon today. So I want to -- said
- 17 something about the Consumer Fraud Act issue, which
- 18 again factors into the \$120 overstatement of the
- 19 | charge.
- I would not regard this as a sufficient issue
- 21 set aside for judgment. I just wanted to really hone
- 22 | in on what I think is the real issues that are on the
- 23 table. There was no intent that the Statute is
- 24 directed at. There's nothing in my view unconscionable
- 25 about the \$120 differential. -- may have been a

#### Findings

1	mistake in calculation.	I would not regard this as
2	such magnitude to invoke	the Consumer Fraud Act to be
3	regarded as a sufficient	meritorious defense to vacate
4	the judgment.	

So it really does come down in my mind to the issue of the Fair Foreclosure Act. And for the reasons I've already stated on the record, I regard the complaint as being sufficiently supported in accordance with the rules of Court for a foreclosure action. I think that tells you what you need for the record in the event that you ultimately do want to take it to a higher Court let you know all of my findings based on all of the issues that the Defendant has raised.

MR. BALDWIN: And I do appreciate it. And just to have other clarification. I understand Your Honor has carried the motion until January  $15^{\rm th}$ .

THE COURT: Yes I am.

MR. BALDWIN: Is there a date by which the Plaintiff should complete the reservice of the corrected NOI hopefully in advance of that date so the Court and I will have an opportunity to review it before the 15<sup>th</sup>.

THE COURT: Well, it has to go out in enough time for there to be the period of 30 days from its effective date. So would you think that by two weeks

# Findings

1	from now that that would be enough that it could be
2	served within two weeks Miss McMann.
3	MISS MCMANN: Yes, Judge that's fine.
4	THE COURT: Very good. So the order can so
5	state. And this is the order that I would ask you to
6	send in. You're going to do that Mr. Baldwin.
7	MR. BALDWIN: If Your Honor directs.
8	THE COURT: Why don't you do that. And then
9	you can provide that the motion is carried.
10	Disposition of the motion is carried to January 15th.
11	And if no one needs oral I'm not going to make you come
12	back. I would just do that on the papers what
13	occurs between now and then. You had a question?
14	MISS MCMANN: Judge, how far should we take
15	the sale out then to, the Sheriff's sale.
16	THE COURT: I guess the Tuesday after that.
.17	MISS MCMANN: Okay.
18	THE COURT: It would be the 19th actually.
19	Now, that's the day before Martin Luther King, the
20	Court holiday.
21	MISS MAMANON: The following Tuesday.
22	THE COURT: Yes, why not. Let's say January
23	26 <sup>th</sup> .
24	MISS MCMANN: Okay.
25	THE COURT: It will be the next Sheriff's

#### Colloquy

sale date. So I don't know what happened this 1 2 afternoon. I don't know if you do. 3 MISS MCMANN: I'll notify my office immediately. 4 5 THE COURT: All right. 6 MISS MCMANN: Contact the Sheriff. 7 THE COURT: I mean they have gone back to 8 your client. That's what usually is what happens when it --9 10 MISS MCMANN: Right. THE COURT: But if in the event it was sold 11 to a third party I'm obviously vacating that. So I 12 13 think you could let counsel know that if in fact that 14 has to be included in the order it should be put in the 15 order. MISS MCMANN: Yes Judge. 16 MR. BALDWIN: Your Honor, -- that any sale 17 18 which may have taken place as of now is vacated? 19 THE COURT: That's right. 20 MR. FIELDS: Okay. THE COURT: That's right. Exactly. Okay. 21 22 Any other questions? Anything else that we need to go 23 over. 24 MR. BALDWIN: Well, Your Honor I thought you

made a ruling. You suggested you were going to make a

ruling on my due process argument relating to the 451F 1 2 part of the motion. 3 THE COURT: Well, I think that is the issue is it not of the true copy? 4 MR. BALDWIN: Yes. 5 6 THE COURT: That's saying the same thing. 7 The subsection F is the true copy issue. And I'm denying the motion under subsection F for the reason 8 that I have found that Plaintiff had complied with the intent and the spirit and the language of Rule 4:54-2 10 as it is presently interpreted by Courts and by the 11 foreclosure --12 In other words I'm not going to require 13 14 anybody from -- Ohio in order to certify that it's a true copy. That's the same holding of the Court. 15 MR. BALDWIN: I would hope though that the 16 Court could require the Plaintiff to simply provide 17 counsel with the original which would obviated the 18 problem. The letter is ready to go to Ohio but why not 19 bring the mountain to Mohammad instead of vice versa. 20 THE COURT: I don't think it's good practice 21 22 to have these originals of these documents floating around the country. I really don't. 23 MR. BALDWIN: Your Honor, if an original was 24

lost there's a provision in the evidence rules on how

1 the original can be proven. And how a copy can be used in lieu of the original if the original lost. I mean 3 the rules cover all these eventualities. They're not impossibilities. It would be very straightforward I 5 believe for the lawyers to comply with the rule.

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THE COURT: I can foresee nightmarish results. I am not going to require that again. I think that is for policymakers and not for myself to issue that kind of a finding under the language of the rule. It doesn't say that. It says for a reason an attorney can make a certification. Now, a lot of the way things are done today as I said before are electronic.

Just the way our society functions, transfers are done electronically. You don't have someone walking in with an original note all the time now. And it's just the way it is. And I just think it would create a horrible log jam if I did otherwise. So I'm not going to require that type of suggestion.

MR. BALDWIN: But you did suggest earlier in our argument that you were considering requiring the Plaintiff to provide a certified copy, certified by somebody somewhere who had seen the original.

THE COURT: Sure we could do that but then you said you would be back in a month or two saying

1	that not enough so why should I make them do it. I
2	would be willing to do that. If that would basically
3	alleviate your client's concern, sure. I would say
4	they have to get a custodian or some kind of records
5	person at US Bank or one of their entities, right.
6	MISS MCMANN: Correct Your Honor, yes.
7	THE COURT: To say we are holding the
8	original and this is a true copy. We can so certify an
9	exact true copy of what we are holding. But you
10	pointed out that the rule doesn't really make provision
11	for that. So I don't see any point of having them go
12	through that effort.
13	MR. BALDWIN: I'm was just going to run
14	through my notes with the Court and counsel to make
15	sure that I've got all the points that have to be
16	incorporated in the order.
17	THE COURT: Absolutely.
18	MR. BALDWIN: The motion is carried until the
19	15 <sup>th</sup> of January.
20	THE COURT: Yes.
21	MR. BALDWIN: On plaintiff's application for
22	a leave under 4:51(a) I guess, it's denied under
23	4:51(f). A new NOI has got to be served within two

weeks I'm assuming from today's date. The Sheriff's

sale is carried Your Honor said until January 26<sup>th</sup>.

L	Could I ask that that aspect of the order be couched in
2	the negative so that the Sheriff's sale shall be
	carried them until further order of the Court

THE COURT: Well, I think what you could say is no Sheriff's sale may take place until January  $26^{\rm th}$  at the earliest.

MR. BALDWIN: Okay. And any sale which may have taken place up to now is vacated.

THE COURT: Yes. Today actually. Today -- is a sale day. So any sale that has taken place on this date is vacated by the Court.

MR. BALDWIN: So Your Honor just for logical consistency. I don't want to shoot myself in the foot, but it seems to me that Your Honor has already ruled against me on 4:51(a) on the basis that my client did not show excusable neglect in attempting to rectify their problem. I can see by the expression on your face you know where I'm going here.

THE COURT: I do.

MR. BALDWIN: At the same time you're giving me relief under 4:51(a) by requiring the Plaintiff to comply with the Fair Foreclosure Act within two weeks. If they don't do that would that be grounds for me to come back under 4:51(a) and ask for relief. I'm just a little at a loss.

THE COURT: I think I would have to say yes.
MR. BALDWIN: Okay.
THE COURT: I think I would have to say yes.
MR. BALDWIN: Okay. Thank you Judge.
THE COURT: And if there is any other
evidence you would want to present that at the time of
the excusable neglect just do it on notice to
adversary and she can respond accordingly. And if I
have to have more oral argument I will.
But I think that I'm doing this because of
the importance of the Fair Foreclosure Act in all
respects in all of these foreclosure cases. I'm trying
to do what the, you know, the legislature wants to
enable people to stay in their homes. That's the whole
goal of it. And that coupled with the fact that you
have a mediation application pending. And we know that
once a Sheriff's sale takes place that is of no use.
And your clients are getting the benefit
therefore of the policy today in New Jersey, given more
time that they need to solve their problems if possible
wants them to realize they're getting the full benefit
of what the judiciary's policy is right now. And I
have a legal reason to do it.

So it's just for the reasons stated on the record you don't even have to go into any of that.

1 I've made a complete record so that anybody who wants
2 to can examine it --

MR. BALDWIN: And I appreciate it. Can I ask the Court for consideration on one very narrow issue.

THE COURT: yes.

MR. BALDWIN: This case is going to be over

January 15<sup>th</sup> one way or the other because either on the

15<sup>th</sup> the corrected Notice of Intent will have been

served in which case my motion is going to be denied in

its entirety or the NOI will not have been re-served

and Your Honor will entertain my application renewed

under 4:51(a) to vacate the default judgment.

THE COURT: Fair enough.

MR. BALDWIN: If the case is not -- if I'm dismissed -- if my motion is denied in its entirely on the  $15^{\rm th}$ .

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BALDWIN: I would seriously be considering an appeal. And between the 15<sup>th</sup> and the 16<sup>th</sup> is 11 days. And I'd ask that the Court make the Sheriff's sale date perhaps two weeks after that so that I would have a window of time within which to process an application for a stay with the Appellate Division so that I could deal with those issues because again if the sale takes place while I'm in the

Appellate Division some place that would afford no one any relief whatsoever.

But if I have another period of ten days in addition to the in other words some time in February, the first week of February, second week of February I would then have enough time to get that done without having my clients lose their property and therefore lose the remedy while it was waiting in line at the Appellate Division.

THE COURT: All right. -- I am going to handle it this way. I think that application is to immature at this point in time. There's no need for me to consider it. It is something that you can -- in the January 15<sup>th</sup> -- that motion is denied right now we don't know all 100 percent certain that is going to happen. I would consider what you're saying when it's ripe.

But remember also that even if you are denied the vacating of the judgment and they are left to their Sheriff's sale remedy and if you have a mediation pending scheduled by next -- which I hope you will to be had within a month or so, oh I would absolutely definitely put off that Sheriff's sale -- I think that our rules require it.

So you wouldn't be in jeopardy of a Sheriff's

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## Colloquy

1	sale at that point in time for a couple of reasons that
2	may affect whether you take an appeal or not. Just
3	something keep your thoughts.
4	MR. BALDWIN: Right. Thank you very much. I
5	appreciate it.
6	THE COURT: You're very welcome. Anybody
7	else.
8	MISS MCMANN: Nothing Judge. Thank you.
9	THE COURT: Okay. You're very welcome. Good
10	luck.
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13	(Hearing Concludes)
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### Certification

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